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Abstract 
This paper examines the three strikes and preventive detention sentencing schemes. 
They both essentially deal with how to handle repeat violent and sexual offenders, but do so 
in very different ways. This paper answers the question of which sentencing scheme is better 
and whether we actually need them both. 
Four key areas are identified for companson: consistency with our national and 
international human rights obligations especially under the ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; how well each sentence 
fulfils the sentencing aims of deterrence and incapacitation; and how each system 
incorporates judicial flexibility and discretion into decision making. 
This paper comes to the conclusion that, while both schemes have some flaw , the 
three strikes regime would create a lot more problems than it would solve. It presents major 
inconsistencies with our international human rights obligation especially with regards to 
disproportionate sentences. It fails to satisfactorily fulfil the aim deterrence and 1s 
outperformed by preventive detention in terms of incapacitation. Lastly it does not afford 
nearly as much discretion to judges and as such makes it a very unattractive option. While 
preventive detention has some flaws of its own, they are relatively minor compared to three 
strikes. This author believes that three strikes should be scrapped in favour of preventive 
detention. 
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1 Introduction 
The Sentencing Parole and Reform Act 2010 ("SAPRA") was pas ed on 31 May 
2010 amending the Sentencing Act 2002 ("the Act"). It introduced the "three strikes" 
sentencing scheme. This scheme, based on a similar system in California, was targeted 
at New Zealand's worst repeat sexual and violent offenders, denying them parole in 
order to improve public safety. 
1 The scheme sets out a number of qualifying offences, 
which on conviction means an offender receives a warning ("strike"), which escalates in 
consequence to three strikes, where an offender receives a mandatory maximum 
sentence for that offence without parole . 
Before the new provisions, New Zealand already had a mechanism in place to 
protect the public from repeat violent and sexual offenders - the entence of preventive 
detention.
2 Preventive detention is an indeterminate sentence available to judge when 
an offender has committed a serious sexual or violent offence and is thought likely to 
commit another qualifying offence after serving a determinate sentence. Once imposed 
an offender will not be released until the Parole Board i atisfied they no longer pose a 
threat to society . 
This essay will compare three strikes with preventive detention in a number of 
areas to see which scheme is more successful at achieving its aims and whether we need 
them both. It will assess their compliance with the ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
("BORA") as well our international obligations such as tho e under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") . lt will then look at each scheme' 
fulfilment of the aims of sentencing, before assessing their ability to incorporate a pect 
of judicial flexibility to sentence according to the facts of each case. It i argued in this 
paper that, while neither system is perfect, preventive detention i the better option of 
the two, and three strikes should be crapped . 
1 entencing and Parole Reform Act 20 I 0, s 3. 
2 Sentencin g Act 2002, s 87 . 
3 
II Legislation 
A Three Strikes 
The list of offences that will attract a strike is found in section 86A.
3 
They are 
comprised of sexual and vio lent offences which carry a maximum sentence of seven 
years or more. Strikes will only apply if the offence is committed after the new scheme 
has come into force and if the offender is over 18 years at the time of the offence.
4 
On committing one of the offences set out in section 86A, the offender receives 
their first warning and is sentenced a usual. 
5 Once the offender has committed a 
qualifying offence after receiving their first warning, they receive a final warning and 
are sentenced normally with the exception that their sentence must be served without 
parole.6 
Once an offender has received their third strike the court must sentence them to 
the maximum tem1 of imprisonment for that offence. 
7 This must be served without 
parole unless it would be "manifestly unjust" to do so.
8 If the second or third strike 
offence i murder, then the offender must be sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole.9 This is once again subject to the "manifestly unjust" test. 
Although this is a mandatory sentencing scheme, it does not preclude the court 
from imposing a sentence of preventive detention at any stage. Parliament made it 
explicit that this entence was still available for a strike three offence.
10 
In this case, the 
minimum period of imprisonment under section 89 must not be less that the maximum 
available detenninate sentence for that offence. For example, a person convicted of a 
third strike for indecent assault and sentenced to preventive detention would receive a 
minimum non-parole period of seven years. 
' !bid, s 86A. 
4 [bid . 
5 !bid, s 868. 
0 Ibid, s 86C(4)(a). 
7 Ibid , s 860(2) . 
K • 
Ibid , s 860(3 ). 
Q Ibid , s 86E(2)(b). 
IU Ibid , s 860(7). 
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B Preventive Detention 
The provisions for preventive detention are set out in ections 87-90 of the Act. 
Section 87( I) clearly states that the object of preventive detention is to protect the 
community, thus making it a predominately preventive rather than a punitive sentence. 
11 
The sentence is only available if the offender commits a qualifying offence, as defined 
in subsection 5, was over 18 at the time of the offence and is "likely to commit another 
qualifying sexual or violent offence" if released after a detem1inate sentence. 12 
When determining whether a preventive detention sentence is applicable the 
court takes into account a number of factors including criminal history, the seriou ness 
of the harm, potential to commit future crimes and failure to mitigate the cau e of 
offending. 13 Section 87(4)(e) makes it clear that a lengthy detenninate sentence is 
preferable if it would provide adequate protection for ociety. 14 Subsection 5 covers 
almost the same set of offences as three strikes excluding murder.
15 
Before an order of preventive detention can be imposed, the court must consider 
reports from two health assessors about the offender's likelihood of committing further 
qualifying offences. 16 
If the sentence is imposed then the offender must serve a minimum of five years 
imprisonment. 17 The court has the power to increase this length if it does not feel it 
reflects the gravity of the offence or does not afford enough protection to the community 
in light of the risk posed by offender. 18 The minimum term imposed must be the one 
which satisfies the longer of these two goals. 
11 Ibid , s 87(1 ). 
12 Ibid , s 87(2)(c). 
11 Ibid , s 87(4). 
14 Ibid , s 87(4)(e). 
15 Murder is excluded because life imprisonment is it self an indetem1inate sentence with the ability to set 
minimum non-parole periods, and so to include it in preventive detention would be superfluous. 
16 Ibid , s 88( I )(b) . 
17 Ibid, s 89(1 ). 
18 Ibid, s 89(2) 
III Bill of Rights and International Obligations Compatibility 
ew Zealand is bound to uphold minimum standards of human rights as a party 
to various international conventions and covenants such as the ICCPR and the United 
ations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment ("CAT"). It has also passed BORA reaffirming these rights at a domestic 
level. Both three strikes and preventive detention raise some areas of inconsistency with 
our national and international obligations. 
A Disproportionately Severe and Arbitra,y Sentences 
Articles 7 and 9( I) of the ICCPR state that no one should be subjected to 
disproportionately severe treatment or arbitrary arrest or detention. This is codified in 
section 9 of BORA. 19 Both three strikes and preventive detention have possible 
inconsistencies in this area. 
Under the three strikes system, a strike is handed down to offenders simply on 
conviction, rather than a sentence over a certain length. Although the list has been 
filtered to only include serious offences, it does not differentiate between different levels 
of offending within an offence. This increases the risk of offenders receiving 
disproportionately severe treatment, and is thereby contrary to the sentencing principle 
of 'just deserts', which states that punislunent should be proportionate to the offence 
committed.20 Something is disproportionately severe if it is "grossly disproportionate to 
the circumstances";21 it would describe a sentence that " ew Zealanders would 
nevertheless regard as so out of proportion to the particular circumstances as to cause 
shock and revu ls ion". 22 
Another possible inconsi tency is the sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole. When the Attorney-General vetted the bill for incon istencies with BORA, he 
con idered this sentence may be severe, but it does not reach the high threshold required 
19 New Zealand Bill of Right s Act 1990, s 9. 
20 Andrew Ashworth Senlencing & Criminal Justice (4th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010) at 84. 
, I 
- Taunoa ,. A11omey-General [2007] ZSC 70; [2008] I ZLR 429 at [ 176]. 
22 Ibid, at [ 172]. The issue of disproportionate sentences is discussed further below at 6 A. 
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to breach section 9 of BORA. 23 He also noted that the sentence had been used recently 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. 24 However, just because the sentence is 
used in other jurisdictions does not automatically mean it is consistent with international 
obligations. In their report on the bill, the Ministry of Justice noted that this sentence 
should be limited to the most serious cases involving specific aggravating circumstances 
as found in section 9 of the Act. 25 By not taking this into account, and thus treating all 
murders as the same, there is the distinct possibility of disproportionate sentencing. 
Under this system, a person who commits murder but pleads guilty straight away and 
shows genuine remorse will be considered the same as someone who commits a 
particularly cruel, premeditated murder with a weapon having gained unlawful entry 
onto the premises. Usually a judge would give the former a much shorter minimum non-
parole period, but under three strikes, both would receive life imprisonment without 
parole if they already had one previous strike. 
Preventive detention has also received some criticism under Article 9 of the 
ICCPR. The Penal Policy Review Committee in 1981 found that it was "arbitrary, 
selective and inequitable". 26 It was arbitrary because, at the time, preventive detention 
only covered serious sexual offences and nothing else. Because offenders could only be 
released on permission of the Minister of Justice and not the Parole Board, it was 
arbitrary as it was in the hands of a politician who may take other factors such as public 
perception into account. It was also used inconsistently, which wa partly due to the lack 
of guidelines available as to when it should be used . 
These criticisms have since been addressed by new legislation. The Penal Policy 
Review Committee report was filed in 1981 before the passing of the Criminal Ju tice 
Act I 985 and the Sentencing Act 2002, which enhanced some of the safeguards for the 
sentence. The sentence has now been expanded to include non- exual serious violent 
offences, and the power of release now rests with the Parole Board. The Sentencing Act 
23 Hon Christopher Finlayson Interim Report of the Attorney-Genera/ under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (2009) at [21 ]. 
24 Ibid , at [22]. 
25 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9. 
26 Penal Policy Review Committee Report of the Penal Poli(r Re, ·iew Committee (prepared for the 
Ministry of Justice 1981) at 59. 
7 
2002 also enshrined the factors set out in R v Leitch that must be taken into account 
when deciding if a sentence of preventive detention is available.
27 
B Removing Parole 
Three trikes could also be inconsistent with section 23(5) of BORA and the 
corresponding Article 10(1) ofICCPR. lt states that "[e]veryone deprived of liberty shall 
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person. "
28 
In 
their submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the bill, the New Zealand 
Council for Civil Liberties expressed concern that by forcing offenders to serve their 
sentence without parole for a strike two or three offence, that we are not treating them 
with humanity and respect.
29 
The removal of parole eligibility undermines any form of rehabilitation that the 
offenders could receive in prison. 30 By taking away parole we are effectively saying to 
the offenders that we think they have no opportunity to refom1 themselves. While the 
Government is committed to rehabilitative measures, it has been made clear that this 
legislation i not. 31 By imposing sentences without parole we may be causing prisoners 
undue mental suffering. This is inconsistent with our obligations under article I ( l) of 
CAT. 32 It could lead to an increase in prison violence as offenders no longer need to be 
on good behaviour while incarcerated consequently making the jobs of our prison 
officers much harder and possibly endangering their lives. 
33 
This inconsistency is further exacerbated when we consider the provisions for 
murder. If an offender commits murder as a second or third strike the court must impose 
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The only exception to this is if the judge 
27 R ,. Leitch [ 1998) I ZLR 420 (CA) at 429. Discussed in more detail below at 6 A. 
ix ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 26. 
29 ew Zealand Counctl for i, ii Liberties "Submission on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill" at 2. 
io Warren Brook banks and Richard Ekins "Criminal injustice and the proposed 'three strikes' law" (20 I 0) 
Maxim Institute, at 11 <www.maxim.org.nz>. 
11 (25 May 2010) 664 NZPD 11228. 
12 "Any act by which severe pam or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person ... " 
11 Brookbanks and Ekins. above n 30, at 11 . 
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considers the non-parole part of the sentence "manifestly unjust" .34 If this is the case, the 
judge may impose a finite non-parole period. However the threshold to reach this 
exception is likely to be extremely high in practice and con equently most will receive 
no parole. It should be noted that it is not considered international best practice to 
sentence someone to life without parole. 35 It is not even available for crimes again t 
humanity or genocide in the International Criminal Court.36 It has been held by the 
Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights that this sentence may rai e 
inconsistencies with Article 7 of the ICCPR. 37 
C Review of Sentence 
Although preventive detention does not present problems with regard to parole, 
it may raise another inconsistency with Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, which grants an 
offender the right to have their sentence reviewed to see if it is still valid. This was 
considered by the European Court of Human Rights in the context of the United 
Kingdom provision for preventive detention under article 5( 4) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This section is almost identical to the ICCPR. 
In the case of Weeks it was held that the punitive and preventive part of the 
sentence must be distinct to enable regular review of the preventive part once the 
punitive part has been served. 38 In ew Zealand the punitive part of a preventive 
detention sentence is the mandatory minimum non-parole term which is attached to it. 
However, according to the Act, when considering what length this period hould be the 
judge must also consider the minimum length of time required to protect the afety of 
the community from the offenders poss ible reoffending. 39 The total length of the 
minimum non-parole period must be the longer of these two periods. Because the judge 
does not say how much each factor weighed into their detennination it is poss ible that 
the Parole Board may not start reviewing the sentence early enough if the preventive 
14 Discussed in more detail below at 6 D. 
15 Human Rights Commission " ubmi ssion to the Law and Order elect ommittee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 20 I O" at [ 4. I I ]. 
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal ourt (open for signature 17 July 1998, entered into force I 
July 2002), art 110(3). 
17 Human Rights om mission" ubmission" , above n 35, at [4. 16]. 
18 Weeks,. United Kingdom ( 1988) I O EI IRR 293 (ECHR). 
19 Sentencing Act 2002, 89(2). 
9 
part is longer than the punitive. Thi could be rectified by requiring judges to specify 
how long the punitive part of the sentence is. 
This poses less of a problem for people sentenced under three strikes. Because 
the sentence is predominately determinate, it is not necessary for the Parole Board to 
keep a se ing whether the sentence is valid. It is not within their powers to override the 
will of the court. This differ from preventive detention where the courts have given 
power to the Parole Board to detennine when they should be released. 
D Aims of the Pe11itentia1y System 
The three strikes scheme i aimed at the punishment and deterrence of repeat 
offender and protecting the community. While these are valid sentencing principles, it 
may also create another inconsistency with our international obligations. Article I 0(3) of 
the ICCPR requires that the es ential aim of the penitentiary system is to be the 
reformation and ocial rehabilitation of prisoners.40 A system which denies parole to 
offenders and seeks to lock them away for long periods of time to protect the community 
is obviously not concerned with their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. It is 
contended that this is undesirable because the successful reintegration of offenders into 
society is a much more effective way to prevent further crimes being committed. 
E Presumption of I1111oce11ce 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee was concerned preventive 
detention might be incon istent with the presumption of i1mocence, specifically whether 
the words " atisfied that the per on is likely to commit another qualifying sexual or 
violent offence if the person is released" in section 87(2)(c) conflict with article 14(2) of 
the ICCPR. 41 Article 14 deals with the presumption of innocence and although the idea 
of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not enshrined in the Covenant, it is the 
40 
International ovenant on ivil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976), art 10(3). 
41 
United Nallons Human Rights ommi ttee Summary Record of the 1394th meeting: Nell' Zealand at 
(19], PRJC R. 1394 (1994) 
10 
widely accepted standard.42 The word " atisfied" has been held by the ew Zealand 
Court of Appeal to mean "makes up its mind". 43 This is clearly not beyond reasonable 
doubt. However since the offender must have already been con idered guilty before 
preventive detention can be considered, in the author's view this is not a conflict. 44 
Preventive detention thus accords with the presumption of innocence which is an 
important cornerstone of any democratic penal system. 
F Double jeopardy 
Another area of concern for preventive detention is in regards to article 14(7) -
prohibition of double jeopardy. This is found under section 26(2) of the New Zealand 
Human Rights Act 1993. 45 The fear is that an offender is being punished for their 
previous crimes again by taking them into account when detennining if they are a 
further risk to society and thus liable to an indeterminate sentence. 
In a Canadian Supreme Court case the judge decided that imposing a sentence 
of preventive detention did not amount to being punished again for pa t crimes. 46 
Rather, the defendant was being "prosecuted for a very senou violent crime and 
subjected to a procedure aimed at determining the appropriate penalty that should be 
inflicted upon him in the circumstances."47 This procedure involved giving more effect 
to the preventive purpose of sentencing. 48 
Although this has not been considered in the context of preventive detention in 
New Zealand it could still be of use. Before we can consider whether preventive 
detention is even available as a sentence, the offender must have committed a qualifying 
offence and be likely to reoffend. If we decide that the sentence is warranted then there 
are two purposes to the sentence - punitive, to deal with current offence, and preventive 
42 Frederic Bostedt "Does the sentence of preventive detention in New Zealand impinge the human rights 
of dangerous offenders?" (LLM Research Paper. Victoria University of Wellington. 2003) at 18. 
41 R , , White (Dm ·id) [ 1988) I NZLR 264 (CA). at 268. 
44 Bostedt. above n 42. at 19. 
45 "No one who ha . been fully acquitted or convicted of. or pardoned for . an offence shall be tried or 
punished for it again ." 
46 R v Lyons [ 1987) 2 CR 309 (SC ). 
4 7 Ibid . at 328. 
48 For ew Zealand see Sentencing Act 2002. s 7( I )(g). 
11 
to stop reoffending. The punitive part is reflected in the minimum non-parole period and 
presents no problem. The preventive part is more concerned with how likely the 
offender is to reoffend. The only part where their previou criminal history could be an 
issue is whether it presents any pattern of offending.
49 It is not directly punishing the 
offender for crimes they have already committed . 
While both systems raise several inconsistencies with our international 
obligations and BORA rights, the most serious are posed by three strikes. Mandatory 
entencing chemes which increase penalties with reoffending bring with them the risk 
that offenders will be sentenced disproportionately to the circumstances of each 
individual offence. Also by removing parole we are not providing help for prisoners that 
may need it. While preventive detention still raises issues with sentence review, most of 
the larger is ues have since been resolved by legislative changes. This makes it a better 
alternative to the three strikes scheme. This paper will now consider each scheme's 
fulfilment of the aims of sentencing, starting with deterrence. 
IV Deterrence 
Deterrence is one of several rationales for criminal punishment. It relies on 
preventing further crime by using the threat or fear of detention. There are two different 
types of deterrence: general and individual. General deterrence aims to deter other 
people from committing a crime by showing what happens to people who do. Individual 
deterrence is aimed at deterring the particular offender from recommitting further 
crimes. Both rely on rational choice theory ("RCT") which says that offenders weigh up 
the advantages and disadvantages before committing an offence. so 
A Knowledge 
Deterrence is stated a one of the mam aims of three strike scheme by its 
proponents. The belief is that if criminals know they are going to face lengthy prison 
entence then this will deter them from committing the crime. California is often 
quoted as an example of where a mandatory sentencing scheme such as this has worked 
to deter criminal . Although the arguments around deterrence predominantly affect three 
4
g entencing Act 2002. s 89(4 )(a). 
'
0 Discussed below at 4 B. 
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strikes because it is one of the key aims of the scheme, the following arguments also 
apply, to some extent, to preventive detention. 
Unlike the publicity surrounding three strikes, the sentence of preventive 
detention is not widely known among the general population. According to Ashworth, 
deterrence must operate through the mind of the offender and the everity of the possible 
sentence must be taken into account so much so that the offender believes that if caught 
and sentenced that penalty will be applied to him. 51 For deterrence to be a successful 
principle of sentencing, these reasons must cause the offender to refrain from 
committing the offence. If the potential offenders have no prior knowledge then this 
removes any deterrent effect it can have on the general public. 
Simple knowledge of a sentence is not enough to deter criminals. For deterrence 
to be effective this knowledge must be an active part of the decision making that goes on 
before a criminal decides to offend, and this is the role of rational choice theory. 
B Rational Choice Theory 
Proponents of this theory believe that criminals weigh up the consequences of 
their criminal actions based on a cost/benefit analysis. - i They believe if criminals know 
they face longer sentences if they are caught, then they will be deterred from committing 
crime. Supporters of the three strikes scheme believe this theory to be true. However, 
studies have found that while this might have some application to white-collar crimes 
such as corporate or bank fraud, there is little to sugge t offenders who commit exual or 
violent crime think the same. 53 Even the evidence for white-co liar crime i 
inconclusive. 54 More often than not, these offenders are driven by irrational motive . 
Academics have also found that other factors weigh more heavily on the offender's 
choice. These include alcohol or drug addiction, mental difficulties and illiteracy. 55 
51 Ashworth , above n 20, at 79. 
52 Rethinking Crime and PW1ishment " econd ubmission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2010" at [12]. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ashworth , above n 20, at 80. 
55 John Pratt "Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee Concerning the ·-n1ree trikes' 
Provisions of the entencing and Parole Bill" at 3. 
13 
When faced with these other problems, offenders are unlikely to give priority to 
consideration of strikes, and other instrumental incentives are rendered irrelevant. 
56 
The same applies for removmg parole eligibility for second and third strike 
offenders. The fact is that parole, or the removal of it, is far too removed from the 
committing of the offence itself and is insufficiently salient.
57 
Once again this relies on 
offenders of sexual and violent crime being rational and calculating people, which is 
often unlikely to be the case. 
C Examples from North America 
The United States, and especially California, is used by proponents of three 
strikes as an example of mandatory sentencing having a deterrent effect on the criminal 
population. 58 However any reduction in crime rates should be put in context. Even 
though the crime rate dropped significantly in California after the introduction of three 
strike , there was a massive corresponding decrease across the entire United States and 
Canada. 59 In fact the largest percentage decrease did not even come in California, but 
ew York.60 either ew York nor Canada have similar three strike provisions. 
61 
It is 
believed that the presence of extra police, aggressive policing and management refonns 
accounted for half of the reduction in crime rates.
62 Thus, categorically saying that the 
decrea e was due to three strikes is incorrect. Most criminologists believe that the 
nationwide drop was attributable to a diverse range of factors, including situational 
crime prevention such as burglar and car alarms. 
63 
56 Rethinking Crime and Punishment, above n 52, at [ 12]. 
57 Ibid , at [ 40] . 
58 Dr Jennifer Walsh attributed the dramatic drop in crime rate solely to tricter sentencing and tightening 
parole eligibility. The Regulatory Impact Statement produced for the bill also mentions California as a 
successful example of this. See Jennifer Walsh "Submission on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill" at 
I; Ministry of Justice Reg11/a101y fmpacl Statemenl: Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (2009) at 4 
59 Franklin Zimring The Greal American Decline (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007) at I 98. 
00 Ibid, al 20 I. 
61 Although ew York had a system called "broken windows" which worked on the assumption tlrnt 
maintaining an ordered and clean environment sends the signal that the place is monitored. This in tum 
leads people to con form to the common nonns of non-criminal behaviour. 
62 Zimring "The Great American Decline", above n 60, at 20 I . 
6
' Pratt , "Submission", above n 55, at 2. 
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D Potential Effectiveness 
The deterrent effect of three strikes has been criticised by many parties, with 
most calling it uncertain at best. In the report from the Law and Order Select Committee 
it was noted that the Department of Corrections thought "there is an implicit as umption 
that the Bill will have no deterrent impact. "64 This cepticism was also shared by the 
Ministry of Justice: 65 
" ... the deterrence effect in the three stage regime is uncertain. The proposals will 
add substantial direct costs to the justice system without creating any 
significantly improved outcomes in terms of reducing the drivers of crime, 
improving social outcomes or reducing reoffending and victimisation." 
Because preventive detention is aimed at the reform of prisoners and topping 
particular people from reoffending it is focussed on individual deterrence. Preventive 
detention may be more effective becau e even after release, offenders are subject to 
recall by the Parole Board for the rest of their life. 66 This acts as a further deterrent for 
offenders. Therefore this sentencing rationale looks more to the propensity to reoffend 
as the main deterrent, rather than the gravity of the crime. 67 
That being said, deterrence is not one of the mam reasons behind preventive 
detention in the first instance. The main purpose is to protect the community from those 
who pose a significant and ongoing risk to the safety of its members . This i achieved 
mainly through incapacitation and rehabilitation. 
While the criticisms of deterrence as a sentencing rationale are valid, this has 
major implications for the three strikes cheme. Proponents of the scheme tell us that 
deterrence is one of the aims of the three strikes system. If deterrence is not uccessful 
as an aim, the necessity and efficacy of three strikes is called into question. Since this 
64 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 20 I O ( 17-2) (select committee report) at 14 . 
65 
( 18 May 2010) 663 NZPD 10930. ll1is viewpoint is supported by Professor Warren Brook banks and Dr 
Richard Ekins; See Brookbanks and Ekins, above n 30, at 10 . 
66 Preventive detention is defined as an indetem1inate sentence for the purposes of the Parole Act 2002; 
see Parole Act 2002, s 4. Any pri soner released on parole from an indeterminate sentence is subject to 
recall for life ; see Parole Act 2002, s 6(4)(d). These conditions are imposed on the offender for life; see 
Parole Act 2002, s 29(3)(b). 
67 Ashworth, above n 20, at 79. 
15 
may be the case, it is submitted that we would be better served by retaining preventive 
detention alone, and attending to some of the deficiencies. This would be better than 
introducing a system which will bring a whole set of new problems while not fixing the 
old ones. ext we move on to deal with the other main sentencing aim - incapacitation. 
V Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is the main method through which both schemes seek to achieve 
their aim of protecting the public. Incapacitation works by removing dangerous and 
repeat offenders from society, thus reducing the crime rate by making them incapable of 
offending for substantial periods of time.
68 
A Length of Sentence 
Three strikes aims to incapacitate the worst repeat offenders who "cannot and 
will not alter their behaviour". 69 This scheme will indeed lead to an increase in the 
prison population and prisoners staying in jail for longer periods. By compelling judges 
to sentence criminals to serve the maximum sentence at stage three, and without parole 
from stage two, people who would previously have served a community sentence will 
now serve it in prison and for a longer time. 
However this may lead to sentences which are not proportionate to the crime 
committed. One example of this could be aggravated robbery which carries a maximum 
sentence of 14 years. 70 Instead of using actual violence, two or three offenders "standing 
over" a victim demanding a jacket or some such item constitutes an aggravated 
robbery. 7 1 W11ere one might expect a very short sentence, or maybe community sentence 
in this ituation, if this was the offenders third strike, they would automatically get 14 
I 
71 
years and no paro e. -
6s Ibid, at 84. 
6g (25 May 2010) 664 NZPD 11236. 
7° Crimes Act 1961, s 235 . 
71 Rethinking nme and Punishment, above n 52, at [33] . 
72 If the sentence would have been three months and then taking into account that they would only serve 
half because of parole, the offender could serve up to l I 2 times longer in jail. This represents an increase 
of l l ,200°0: Ibid, at [30]. 
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Preventive detention may actually result in longer sentences for criminals than 
three strikes because it is not bound by the statutory maximum sentences. This is most 
evident for some of the lesser offences covered by the three strike regime, such as 
indecent assault which carries a maximum of seven years. When the courts are faced 
with an offence that is not a third strike it may take into account the gravity of the 
offence and the potential risk the offender presents to society to increase the minimum 
detention period as opposed to the current requirement of at least five years in just 
before current. 73 After that the prisoner is still ubject to remain in prison until the 
Parole Board feels they no longer pose any risk. Under new provisions in SAPRA, if a 
sentence of preventive detention is ordered when the offender would have received their 
third strike, the court must now impose a minimum non-parole period which is equal to 
the maximum sentence for that crime. 74 Thi will lead to a longer sentence than under 
three strikes. It should also be noted that incapacitation would be more effective under 
preventive detention rather than three strikes because it will also be coupled with 
rehabilitative treatment. 
B Parole and Rehabilitation 
The incapacitation of prisoners allows them to go through rehabilitation so that 
they can reintegrate with society upon their release. Parole is the mechani m through 
which the Parole Board can assess the risks offender pose and track their rehabilitation. 
The three strikes scheme remove parole eligibility for all offenders convicted of 
a second or third strike. This undermines any fonn of rehabilitation that the offenders 
could receive in prison. 75 While incarcerated, prisoners are theoretically on good 
behaviour because it helps their chances of being released on parole earlier. This good 
behaviour can include genuine attempts to rehabilitate them elve by gaining practical 
skills that can be used when they are released , and in tum make reintegration into 
society a lot easier which is a better outcome for the community at large. While 
offenders remain in pri on, if they do not rehabilitate they pose no ri k to the 
community but a lack of rehabilitation becomes problematic once the prisoner is 
n entencing Act 2002, s 89( I) and (2). 
74 [bid , s 860(7)(b) . 
75 Brookbanks and Ekins, above n 30, at 11 . 
l 7 
released (as they will be for offences except for those attracting a life sentence without 
parole). Removing parole therefore removes one of the major incentives for prisoner 
rehabilitation. 
Unless prisoners have a genuine desire to reform themselves, removing parole 
takes away any other benefits it has for them. ow no matter what they do they will not 
be getting out early. This could have another potentially negative effect. If prisoners 
have no reason to behave in prison then this could lead to an increase in prison 
vio Jenee, 76 increasing the difficulty for prison officers in performing their role, and 
creating considerable safety risks. 
Conversely, for preventive detention, rehabilitation works as the ultimate 
incentive for the prisoner. This is simply because rehabilitation presents the only chance 
of prisoners being released, an incentive recognised by the courts:
77 
"Successful participation in a course of treatment, such that (the offender) will 
not pose an undue risk to the safety of the community is released, will be 
determinative of his final release date. TI1e advantage of this incentive by 
comparison to the situation of a prisoner subject to a finite sentence is obvious." 
Unlike a fmite sentence, the prisoner will not be released after serving a specific 
amount of time. This is the entire point about sentencing a prisoner to preventive 
detention. They will not be released until they satisfy the Parole Board, through 
undergoing rehabilitative treatment, that they no longer pose a significant and ongoing 
ri k to the afety of the community. 
Prisoners who are released from a preventive detention sentence are subject to a 
lifetime recall at the discretion of the Parole Board. 78 This is to ensure a prisoner who is 
relea ed and looks likely to reoffend again may be brought back to prison before any 
further offences are committed. This encourage proper rehabilitation because the 
76 Ibid . 
11 R , , Bailey CA 102 03, 22 July 2003 at [23]. 
n Parole Act 2002, s 6(4)(d) . See also above n 66. 
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offender knows that they must continue to stay out of trouble or they will be back in 
pnson. 
While prisoners serving three strikes sentences can still be subject to conditions 
after release, they are not as strong. For prisoners who are relea ed after their first strike 
the length of time these conditions can last is significant shorter than the lifetime recall 
that preventive detention offenders are subject to. Those who serve sentences for a 
second or third strike can no longer be recalled by the Parole Board as there is no parole. 
C Future Offending 
The sentence for both three strikes and preventive detention works on the notion 
that by taking likely re-offenders out of society we are protecting it. However it is 
argued here that locking people up because of possible future offending is not as 
effective as proponents of the scheme argue. 
There is doubt as to whether incapacitation actually reduces crime. Studies have 
shown incapacitative sentencing draws in more 'non-dangerous' than 'dangerous' 
offenders, with a 'false-positive' rate of up to two-thirds. 79 This means that incapacitative 
methods are holding more people who actually would not reoffend. We could then ay 
that the increased length of sentences for these people might not be justified rn every 
single case. 
This problem affects preventive detention as well. Prediction studies have hown 
that the authorities have only about a 50 per cent chance of getting future offending 
assessments right. 80 The inability of the Parole Board to accurately predict this can lead 
to administrative caution and therefore disproportionately long periods of detention. 81 
This even Jed the Institute of Criminology at Victoria Univer ity to recommend the 
abo lition of the sentence as the prediction of future offending was the basi on which the 
79 Ashworth, above n 20, at 84. 
80 Pratt "Submission", above n 55, at 4. 
81 John Meek "The Revival of Preventive Detention in ew Zealand 1986-93" (1995) 28 ANZJC 1 at 22. 
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sentence lay, 82 although in recent times it has been put forward as a better alternative 
than three trikes in this regard. 
83 
The inability to accurately predict an offender's future offending can actually 
have a harmful effect on their rehabilitation. Some studies have concluded that the 
imprecise nature of basing incarceration on prediction of future crimes can have a 
negative effect on a prisoner's psyche. 
84 To some prisoners it will seem that they are 
being unfairly punished for something they have not yet committed. This is reminiscent 
of the movie Minority Report where people are arrested before crimes happen on the 
basis that a machine predicted their future offending.
85 
D Prison Population 
Schemes like three strikes are almost certainly going to result in an influx of 
people being sent to prison. ew Zealand already has a problem with overpopulated 
prisons and this will do nothing to help that. The Regulatory Impact Statement prepared 
by the Ministry of Justice for this legislation pointed out that the greatest cost of this 
scheme will be felt from the increase in prison population resulting in an increase of the 
financial pressure on the Department of Corrections. 
86 It has been projected that after 50 
years, the increase in beds will 727. 
87 
In the United States and United Kingdom, studies have shown that mandatory 
sentencing and 'truth-in- entencing' policies have caused prison populations to rise so 
much that prisoners are being granted early administrative release. This is because the 
population grew so much, so fast, that there just were not enough beds to house them all. 
In 2007 alone, England released 11 ,000 prisoners due to overcrowding. 
88 While we may 
not see the ame rate of increase in ew Zealand as seen in the United States and United 
82 Ibid , at 32 . 
81 Pratt "Submission", above n 55, at 2. 
84 Meek, above n 81, at 19. 
85 Minority Report (Steven Spielberg, 2002). 
86 Ministry of Justice "Regulatory Impact tatement" , above n 58, at 5. 
S7 Department of Corrections Sentencing and Parole Reform Bi!!: Departmental Report (2010) at 80. 
88 Pratt "Submission", above n 55, at 4. 
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Kingdom, this policy presents the real possibility that our already overcrowded prisons 
are about to get even more crowded. 
E Prior Convictions 
An important factor in both schemes is how soon we would see them at full 
efficacy. In tenns of the three strikes scheme the public may have false idea that it will 
be effective strajght away. This is not true. This scheme is not retrospective which 
means that the full effects of the legislation are still 15-20 years away, when we are 
likely to see the first third strike offenders coming through. While this is not a major 
sticking point against the legislation itself, there is the danger of public backlash once it 
becomes clear that three strikes will result in relatively little change in the hort term. 
However, for preventive detention, no previous convictions are required for the 
sentence to be available. This change was brought about by the Sentencing Act 2002 and 
significantly broadens the number of offenders potentially eligible for the sentence. This 
means if there is a clear indicator that an offender is likely to reoffend, the court does 
not have to wait before they commit more offences to give them a lengthy sentence. All 
that is needed to be taken into consideration is the seriousness of the offending and the 
need to protect the public. 89 It has been made clear by the courts that this sentence is no 
longer one of last resort. 90 
F Inconsistency 
One of the problems surrounding preventive detention is the infrequent and 
inconsistent nature of its use. Studies have shown that indeterminate sentences 
contributed to anxiety of those subject to them because of the "inevitable inconsistencies 
in the length of time different inmates were required to serve. "9 1 For many year 
preventive detention was rarely used by judge because of the lack of coherent 
guidelines as to when it should be used. In the period 1968- 1986 the entence was 
9 R v B1 yant CA 236/03 , I 6 December 2003 . 
90 R ,. C [2003] I ZLR 30 (CA). 
9 1 Meek, above n 81 , at 19. 
2 1 
imposed only 28 times at an average of 1.5 per year. 92 This shows a certain amount of 
concern from the judges at using such a sentence, which also concerned the Penal Policy 
Review Committee when it looked into the offence in 1981 . 93 However with each 
legislative change removing certain restrictions on the offence, the use has increased and 
it now averages about 17 sentences a year. 94 With the emergence of clear guidelines for 
when judges should use this sentence, some of the concerns around its inconsistent and 
infrequent use have now been remedied. 
A recent development could see preventive detention used less though. The 
Parole (Extended Supervision) Amendment Act 2004 ("PESA") states that any offender 
who i subject to a determinate prison sentence for a relevant offence may, on 
application to the Court, be subjected to an extended supervision order ("ESO") for up to 
10 years. lt was held that the availability of this order should be taken into account when 
considering preventive detention in light of section 87(4)(e) and the preference of a 
lengthy detenninate sentence. 95 Where a case is finely balanced, an ESO it likely to tip 
the balance in favour of a determinate sentence. 96 Between 8 July 2004 (when PESA 
came into force) and 31 December 2007, preventive detention was imposed in 24 cases 
where the offender qualified for an ES0. 97 However, there were a number of cases, 
usually involving lower level offending, where the possibility of an ESO, either of itself 
or in combination with other factors, resulted in the court declining to impose preventive 
detention. 98 
Although both scheme are effective at keeping the worst repeat offenders in 
prison, it i preventive detention that would do a better job. It is more likely to keep 
offender in prisons longer. When you couple this with the rehabilitative potential that it 
92 Ibid . at 35 . 
9
' Penal Policy Review Committee. above n 26. at 59. 
94 
Chris Hurd "The changmg face of preventive detention in New Zealand" (paper presented to the 
Sentencmg Conference. ational Judicial College of Australia . February 2008) at [25]. 
95 R r Mist [2005] 2 NZLR 79 1 ( A). 
96 R ,. Parahi [2005) 3 NZLR 356 ( A) . 
97 llurd, above n 94, at [65). 
98 
ee, for example: R ,, Clark !IC Auckland CRI-2003-044-6564. 6 December 2005; R ,, M IIC 
Auckland CRI-2004-090-7513. 21 February 2006; R ,. Moore HC Hamilton CRJ-2006-019-1786. 9 May 
2006. 
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offers, preventive detention is clearly the better option. The last and most important 
consideration is the amount of flexibility judges have when handing down sentences. 
VJ Judicial Flexibility 
Sentencing has traditionally been a key part of what the judiciary does. Although 
Parliament sets out maximum penalties and factors to be taken into account, these have 
always been guidelines to help judges make decisions - not to make them for them. 
Preventive detention is better in this regard while three strikes goes in the opposite 
direction. 
A Flexibility 
One of the main features of the three strikes regime is that at stage three (and to 
some extent at stage two), it removes nearly all of the flexibility traditionally held by 
judges in sentencing and moves towards mandatory sentences. Thi is the feature that 
has attracted the majority of criticism in ew Zealand. 99 This sy tern overrides all 
factors except criminal history and excludes consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
factors that are usually taken into account at sentencing. 100 These can include issues 
such as: whether there was threatened or actual violence; the degree of injury inflicted; 
the number of victims and whether the crime was planned or unplanned. 101 By removing 
these considerations, we risk treating every instance of a qualifying offence as if it were 
of equal seriousness. The Ministry of Justice acknowledge that some mechani m is 
needed to take into account these circumstances. 102 
The lack of judicial flexibility could only lead to inju tice and disproportionate 
sentencing, especially at stage three. 103 This i a prospect that the Minister in charge of 
the legislation finds tolerable. 104 She i happy for disproportionate re ults at the third 
strike stage, believing that if they have committed two serious offences beforehand then 
99 See, for example, Brookbanks and Ekins, above n 30, at 7; Pratt" ubmission", above n 55, at I . 
100 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9. 
10 1 Rethinking Crime and Punishment, above n 52 , at [34]. 
102 Hon imon Power Cabinet Business Committee: No parole for ll'Orst repeal l'iolent offenders and 
\\'Orsi murder cases (Ministry of Justice 2008) at [ 16]. 
io, Brookbanks and Ekin s, above n 30. at 6. 
104 (4 May 2010) 662 NZPD 10674. 
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they deserve what is commg their way. 105 However, this opens the door for gross 
injustice. Consider someone who had two qualifying convictions in his early twenties.
106 
Having realised the error of his ways, he turns his life around and becomes a mechanic 
and 20 years later is grossly negligent in repairing someone's brakes. They crash and die 
and this man is charged with manslaughter. This man would presumably receive life 
impri onment with a 1 O year non-parole period. 107 Life imprisonment should be 
reserved for the worst of the worst - not cases like this. Unless we can take other 
aggravating and mitigating factors into account, injustices like this will occur under the 
regime. The lack of judicial discretion creates an unfairness that is not present in 
preventive detention. This i a main reason why this paper argues that preventive 
detention offers a better solution than the three strikes scheme. 
Another problem associated with this lack of flexibility is that it may further 
endanger the community. If an offender knows that they are at risk of a third strike and 
will be given the maximum sentence without parole, they are going to be more willing 
to commit further acts of violence to ensure that they do not get caught. This could 
further endanger the lives of victims, police officers or witnesses. 
108 
However, before an offender can be considered for preventive detention, they 
must satisfy three criteria. Much like three strikes, they must have committed a 
qualifying offence and be over 18 at the time the offence was committed. 109 However 
they must also , in the court's opinion, be likely to commit another qualifying offence 
after any determinate sentence that would have been handed down. 110 This sentence 
does not automatically assume that everyone who commits a qualifying offence is going 
to do it again, unlike those who are on their third strike. The power remains with the 
judiciary as to when the sentence should apply and how to apply it. This is apt because 
the power to send someone away for an indeterminate amount of time is one that should 
not be used lightly. 
105 Ibid . 
106 Brookbanks and Ekin . above n 30. at 8. 
107 It would probably be manifestly unjust for him to serve 20 years non-parole. 
108 It should be noted that committing murder may result in the offender receiving a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole and not simply the maximwn sentence. 
109 
entencing Act 2002. s 87(2)(a) and (b) . 
11 0 Ibid. s 87(2)(c). 
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B Discretion 
Another result of conviction based, mandatory sentencing schemes is that it puts 
the onus on police. Since everything is centred around a qualifying conviction, the 
discretion moves to the police to charge the offender with the right crime. The Minister 
of Corrections is happy that police have the proper safeguards and sufficient checks in 
place to ensure that the appropriate charge is laid. 111 She also notes that for a potential 
strike three, the charge must be reviewed by a Crown Solicitor pre-appearance or by the 
second appearance. This is a move criticised by not only the Opposition, but also by the 
police union. During the Third Reading of SAPRA Grant Robertson read a quote from 
the Police Association. They said that "[j]udicial discretion provides a 'safety valve' for 
the myriad of possible circumstances surrounding any given case and is preferable to 
d · .,112 man atory sentencmg. 
Conversely, discretion still remams firmly with the judge for preventive 
detention. Even if an offender meets the criteria for a preventive detention sentence, they 
will not automatically receive one. 11 3 To help the court in this matter, the Act lists five 
considerations that must be taken into account when deciding this: the offender' 
criminal history; the seriousness of the harm to the community; any information relating 
to tendency to commit future offences; the offender's lack of effort in addressing the 
cause of offending and the principle that a lengthy determinate sentence is preferable so 
long as it adequately protects the community. 114 This provide judge with a lot of room 
to move when considering how to use preventive detention. It allow for a fuller picture 
to be taken into account as opposed to maybe just one piece of it, as in three strike . 
Once all of these factors have been considered, and the conclusion is that offender poses 
a significant and ongoing risk to the safety of the community, only then will the 
sentence be appropriate. 
111 (25 May 20 l 0) 664 ZPD l 1228. 
112 (25 May 20 l 0) 664 ZPD 11230. 
1 n R v Leitch, above n 27, at 429. 
114 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87(4)(a)- (e). 
25 
Because of the difficultly associated with predicting an offender's likelihood to 
reoffend, the court must also con ider reports from at least 2 appropriate health 
assessors. However, even if these reports are categorical about the risk of reoffending, 
they only inform the assessment not determinate it.
11 5 This remains a decision for the 
judge. 
It should also be noted that the sentence is no longer one of "last resort" . 
Previously the Court of Appeal had said that preventive detention was only available 
once a lengthy determinate sentence had failed.
116 It is now available for first time 
offenders for two reasons. Firstly it removed that statutory requirement that said that 
preventive detention could only be used on someone who had been convicted of a 
qualifying offence previous to the current one. Secondly, when the Act was brought into 
force, it reduced the minimum non-parole period from ten years to five years. This 
provides the judges greater flexibility in sentence administration. However, it has been 
held that thi change is not a ground for a reduction in the level of seriousness of the 
offending justifying a preventive detention sentence.
117 
In all cases the court will only impose a sentence of preventive detention where 
it is a proportionate response to the crime committed or where it provides the best way 
to manage the risks posed by the offender. Case law and legislation provide judges with 
a number of tools for deciding when this is the case in a way which is fair to the victims 
and the offender. By contrast, it is submitted that three strikes does not allow any real 
ability to tailor entences to the individual offence and offender. 
C Guilty Pleas 
A decline in the number of guilty pleas i another possibility with three strikes. If 
the only thing that is taken into account is a person's criminal history then there is no 
incentive to plead guilty. Previously pleading guilty would usually lower the sentence, 
but with mandatory sentences, this po sibility is removed. Thi will result in an increase 
in trials and trial length. Consequently this will increase the cost of trials and will 
11
~ R \'Murphy A 165 99, 28 Jul y 1999. 
116 Ibid. 
117 R ,. Bailey. above n 77 at [ 19] . 
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inevitably lead to more stress for victims. Brookbanks and Ekins recommend that early 
guilty pleas should see a discount of 25 per cent of the maximum sentence to discourage 
this from happening. 118 This way, depending at which stage the offender pleads guilty, 
they will receive up to a 25 per cent discount on the entence that otherwise would have 
been imposed. For example, an offender who is up for their third trike who pleads 
guilty to sexual violation at the earliest possible opportunity may receive 15 years 
instead of 20 years. Life sentences could have their non-parole period reduced. 
For preventive detention, judges are still able to take into account a guilty plea 
by the offender. Since it is an indeterminate sentence, this can only be done when setting 
the non-parole period. It has been held by the Court of Appeal that a "discrete and 
measurable discount" should be reflected in the non-parole period for a guilty plea. 119 
However, this will never fall below the minimum five year period tipulated by the Act. 
D Manifestly unjust 
The only remaining discretion left to the judges under three strikes is the 
"manifestly unjust" clause attached to strikes two and three. If a judge thinks that 
imposing the sentence without parole is "manifestly unju t" then they may substitute 
something less, and has to provide written reasons for their decision . 120 It is important to 
note that this provision only applies to the non-parole part of the sentence. If the judge 
thinks that the actual length of the sentence is unjust they have no mechanism for 
changing that. In addition, the threshold needed before omething is "manifestly unju t" 
is extremely high. Although it is too early to know how the phrase "manifestly unjust" 
will be interpreted in this context, the same wording i u ed with regard to rebutting the 
presumption of a life sentence for murder. So demanding is the tandard, that it ha 
rarely been reached. One such occasion was a very sick, elderly man who pleaded guilty 
to murdering his wife after they made a uicide pact but wa un ucce ful in his own 
suicide. Both were very unwell and the court found that life impri onment would not be 
just in the situation. 
118 Brookbank and Ekins, above n 30, at 14. 
119 R ,. We/Im [2009] NZCA 175 at [ 16]. 
120 Ibid , s 86C(6); s 860(5). 
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The result of all of this is that three strikes leaves
 very little room for a judge to 
take into account the particular circumstances 
of a case. It essentially treats every 
occurrence of a particular offence the same. Thi
s will almost certainly lead to unjust 
sentences. On the other hand, judges have a 
lot of discretion when considering 
preventive detention and can still take into accoun
t guilty pleas. Sentencing someone to 
prison is the most restrictive action we can take ag
ainst someone's liberty. Judges should 
be able to consider all the facts of the case befor
e making this decision, not just prior 
criminal offences. The potential for unjust outcom
es through lack of discretion is one of 
the main reasons why the three strikes scheme s
hould be scrapped in favour of using 
preventive detention. 
VII Conclusion 
The pa sing of the SAPRA and the heralding
 in of the new three strikes 
entencing regime ha generated a great deal of disc
ussion in New Zealand. While many 
were pleased that something was finally being do
ne about serious violent crime in the 
country, others have expressed concern about ho
w the Government used is doing so. 
One of the arguments expressed against three
 strikes was that we already have 
preventive detention to deal with our worst repeat 
violent criminals. 
This paper sought to examine both sentencing 
regunes with respect to four 
important areas to ee if we really needed three 
strikes at all. It was found that while 
both raised some inconsistencies with our BORA 
and international obligations, most of 
these had since been remedied with respect to pre
ventive detention. On the other hand 
three strikes had the potential to be inconsistent w
ith a large number of rights expressed 
in the ICCPR and CAT. 
One of the major principles three strikes is built o
n is that mandatory sentences 
which increase with reoffending act as a deterrent
 for other criminals. While this is one 
of the rationale for entencing, tudies tend to
 show that neither three strikes nor 
preventive detention would be very effective 
at deterring criminals. However, as 
preventive detention doe not rely on deterrence, th
i ha les of an effect on it. 
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In tenns of incapacitation, both yste1ns seek to promote public safety by 
keeping violent offenders "off the streets". Although preventive detention is used 
infrequently it arguably would keep offenders detained longer in many cases becau e it 
relies on prisoners successfully rehabilitating the1nselve . If a prisoner does not 
rehabilitate then they will not be released. 
Lastly the three strikes regime seeks to remove discretion from the judges and 
impose mandatory sentencing based on a qualifying offence. This effectively moves the 
discretion to the police, who are in charge of making the initial decision to pro ecute. 
Any discretion by the judges is limited to the first and second strikes or the "manifestly 
unjust" provision. Preventive detention i far more traditional in that there are a number 
of factors and criteria to take into account before such a sentence is handed down. This 
is perhaps the most convincing argument for taking preventive detention over three 
strikes. 
Overall the sentence of preventive detention seems to be a much more delicate 
and finely balanced tool to deal with a very serious problem. Three strikes is very blunt 
in its application and has the potential to create more problems than it purports to solve. 
The effectiveness of three strikes seems shaky at best when we consider that, of its two 
key aims, neither seem fulfilled. It is unlikely to deter criminals and preventive detention 
is more effective at keeping re-offenders in prison. When this is coupled with the almost 
complete lack of discretion for judges, the case for three strikes is not strong. This 
author would argue that three strikes is more likely to create more problems than it will 
fix. Although preventive detention also poses some problems, they are more manageable 
which makes it the better option of the two. Consequently, three strike hould be 
scrapped in favour of preventive detention. 
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